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H.R. 1517 (The Clay Bill),1 introduced by Representative William
Clay of Missouri on March 30, 1993, amends the jurisdictional scope
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the National Labor Re-
lations Act (NLRA). Specifically, the Clay Bill extends these labor
laws to a limited class of foreign flag vessels that regularly trade with
the United States.' Presently, foreign flagged vessels are generally
1. H.R. 1517, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Versions of the Bill have previously
been introduced before the House and Senate. See S. 3235, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1992); H.R. 1126, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 3238, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989). See also Supporters Say Clay Bill Would Bolster US Flag, LLOYD'S LIST
(London), May 17, 1993. The version of the Clay Bill before the 102d Congress would
have extended FLSA and NLRA for a trial period of five years, created a group to
study the effects of the legislation on industry, and created a number of exclusions from
the requirements of NLRA and FLSA. H.R. 1126, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Al-
though the Bill passed in the House, the Bush administration's hostility toward the
measure prevented a hearing before the Senate. See Supporters Say Clay Bill Would
Bolster US Flag, LLOYD'S LIST (London), May 17, 1993. For a brief history of the
Clay Bill see Hearing on H.R. 1517, Foreign Flag Ships: Hearing before the Subcom-
mittee on Labor Standards, Occupational Health and Safety of the Committee on
Education and Labor, House of Representatives, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1993)
[hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 1517] (prepared statement of Thomas J. Schneider,
Esq.).
2. H.R. 1517, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Nearly identical language extends the
coverage of FLSA and NLRA. Under the Clay Bill covered employers would include:
(I) a foreign documented vessel, if such vessel is regularly engaged in
transporting passengers from and to a port or place in the United States, with
or without an intervening stop or stops at a foreign port or ports, and such
term also includes a foreign documented vessel that is regularly engaged in
transporting passengers only from or to a port or place in the United States if
(199)
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outside the jurisdiction of both NLRA and FLSA. 3
Throughout recent committee hearings on the Clay Bill, various
interest groups and national governments have questioned the legality
of the Bill's provisions. Specifically, the Bill's opponents charge that the
extension of U.S. labor laws to foreign flagged ships violates interna-
tional law. 4 These opponents have offered several arguments based on
treaties and other sources of the law of nations. Specifically, some as-
the Secretary ["Board" for NLRAI determines that such transport is so ar-
ranged for the purposes of avoiding being considered an employer for pur-
poses of this Act;
(II) a foreign documented nonliner vessel regularly engaged in transport-
ing cargo in the foreign trade of the United States; and
(III) a foreign documented vessel on which occurs the production or
processing of goods or services for sale or distribution in the United States,
and a foreign documented vessel that engages in transporting cargo between
vessels in international waters and a vessel, port, or place in the United States
regardless of the ownership or control of the vessel.
Id. at 2.
The Clay Bill excludes from its coverage certain of these vessels. In relevant part, the
Bill reads:
[This act shall not apply to] any foreign documented vessel that can demon-
strate -
(I) that at least 50 percent of its crew is composed of citizens of the
country of registry; and
(II) that legal title to such vessel is held by citizens of the country of
registry, and beneficial ownership and control, direct or indirect, are held by
citizens of the country of registry....
As used in this subparagraph, the term 'citizen' shall include -
(I) natural persons who are citizens of the country of registry;
(II) a corporation, if its equity is at least 51 percent owned and con-
trolled by citizens of the country of registry;
(III) a partnership, if all the general partners are citizens of the country
of registry and at least 51 percent of the partnership is owned and controlled
by citizens of the country of registry.
Id. at 3.
3. See infra notes 10 and 151 and accompanying text.
4. Hearing on H.R. 1517, supra note 1, at 14 (Department of State, letter to,
from 14 foreign governments). The governments of Belgium, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom "are gravely concerned by [the Clay Bill] which would not be
permissible under customary international law and practice." Id. See also id. at 69
(prepared statement of John Estes, President, International Council of Cruise Lines)
(listing governments that have protested against the passage of the Clay Bill). In addi-
tion to international law concerns, some interested parties have voiced concern over
international retaliation against U.S. flagged ships and U.S. markets abroad. See
House Subcommittee Revives Bogey of Maritime Labour Law, LLOYD'S LisT
(London), Oct. 10, 1992.
THE CLAY BILL
sert that there exists a "customary" legal obligation that the port state
should regard a visiting vessel's flag state as the sovereign over its inter-
nal affairs.5 Embodying a traditional deference to the flag state, this so-
called "internal economy rule" has developed into an obligation of in-
ternational law that limits a territorial sovereign's jurisdiction to regu-
late the domestic affairs of a visiting foreign ship.6
This comment considers whether the Clay Bill is a violation of
U.S. obligations under the internal economy rule. Part I examines the
provisions of the Clay Bill and its legislative purpose. Part II describes
the internal economy rule and establishes that the United States ac-
cepts the rule as a principle of international law. Finally, Part III,
through analyzing U.S. judicial interpretations of the internal economy
rule, concludes that the Clay Bill exceeds the bounds of sovereign
jurisdiction.
I. THE CLAY BILL
The Clay Bill's amendments to FLSA and NLRA would extend
U.S. laws to the employment relationship between a shipowner and
crew - matters within a ship's internal economy.7 Most relevant to the
employment of seamen, FLSA establishes a minimum wage.8 In its
present form, the minimum wage provision does not apply to "any em-
ployee employed as a seaman on a vessel other than an American ves-
sel." 9 Similarly affecting the internal economy of vessels, NLRA guar-
5. Hearing on H.R. 1517, supra note 1, at 14 (Department of State, letter to,
from 14 foreign governments). See also id. at 113 (prepared statement of Philip J.
Loree, Chairman, Federation of American Controlled Shipping) (asserting that the
Clay Bill would violate the rule of international law that reserves to the flag state
jurisdiction over matters of internal order).
6. T. KOCHU THOMMEN, LEGAL STATUS OF GOVERNMENT MERCHANT SHIPS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 49-50 (1962).
7. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372 U.S. 10, 20 (1963) (characterizing
the challenged application of the Labor Management Relations Act as invading the
internal management of a vessel). See also Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1, 12 (1887)
(referring to discipline aboard ship as a matter of internal affairs); 1 Steven F. Friedell,
BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 129 (1992) (regarding wages as a matter of internal
economy).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 206(b) (1988). In addition to minimum wages, FLSA establishes
maximum working hours for employees. Id. § 207. However, seamen of all nations are
expressly exempted from the maximum hour requirement. Id. § 213(b)(6). FLSA also
contains provisions regarding child labor. Id. § 212 (1988). The minimum wage is
currently $4.25 per hour. Id. § 206(a)(1) (amended Nov. 17, 1989).
9. Id. § 213(a)(12). FLSA defines "American Vessel" as including "any vessel
which is documented or numbered under the laws of the United States." Id. § 203 .
The Department of Labor interprets the definition of "American Vessel" as apparently
1994]
202 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 18
antees employees the right to organize and collectively bargain.10
Among its other provisions, the NLRA defines and prohibits unfair la-
bor practices."
The Clay Bill's amendments to FLSA and NLRA would broaden
the jurisdiction of these statutes to include foreign flagged vessels that
are regularly engaged in transporting passengers or cargo in the foreign
trade of the United States. 2 Of these vessels, only those that can prove
that at least half the vessel's crew are citizens of the country of regis-
try'" and whose owners hold both legal title to and beneficial ownership
and control of the vessel are excluded.' 4 These amendments would ap-
ply the substantive provisions of FLSA and NLRA equally to U.S.
shipowners operating under a foreign flag and foreign shipowners oper-
ating under a third nation's flag.' 5
By excluding vessels that are predominantly owned and crewed by
nationals of the country of registry, the Clay Bill targets the owners
and operators of what is commonly referred to as "flag of convenience"
or "open registry" vessels.' 6 Countries permitting open registry allow
ships to fly their national flag regardless of the shipowner or crew's
nationality.17 Operated primarily by developing countries, open regis-
tries can generate registration fees for the flag state amounting to a
signifying "a vessel of the United States as distinguished from a foreign vessel." 29
C.F.R. § 783.38 (1992). This seems to preclude the argument that FLSA, in its pre-
sent form, could be construed to extend to foreign vessels owned or controlled by Amer-
ican citizens. However, the mere flying of the U.S. flag is alone apparently not suffi-
cient for the vessel to fall within the jurisdiction of FLSA. See Cruz v. Chesapeake
Shipping, Inc., 932 F.2d 218, 231 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that FLSA does not apply to
certain U.S. flagged vessels).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). NLRA provides that "[e]mployees shall have the
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities .. " Id.
11. Id. § 158. NLRA also establishes a form of recourse for employees who sus-
pect unfair labor practices. Id. § 160.
12. H.R. 1517, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1993).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. See Supporters Say Clay Bill Would Bolster the US Flag, LLOYDS LIST
(London), May 17, 1993.
17. Eric Pace, Uncertain Crosswinds for 'Flags of Convenience', N.Y. TIMES,
May 16, 1982, at sec. 4 p. 3. Liberia and Panama operate some of the world's largest
"open registries." The ships registered with these and other "flag of convenience" coun-
tries comprise over one quarter of total world tonnage, the majority of which is owned
by U.S., Japanese, Greek, and Hong Kong companies. Id.
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significant portion of national revenue. 8 In exchange for these fees,
shipowners, who would otherwise register their ships in their country of
citizenship or domicile, enjoy relatively lax tax, labor, and safety
laws. 19
The purpose of the Clay Bill is twofold. First, the extension of
FLSA and NLRA would improve the working conditions of seamen
aboard open registry vessels.2 0 Proponents of the Bill allege that
seamen aboard "flag of convenience" vessels, predominately citizen's of
developing nations, suffer exploitative wages and other mistreatment .2
Under FLSA's protection, these seamen would enjoy the same mini-
mum working conditions established for American workers. 2 Second,
commentators on the Bill see it as a catalyst to enlarge U.S. labor
union membership and increase the competitiveness of U.S. flagged
carriers .2 The increased cost of operating these vessels in compliance
18. Id. Reportedly, Liberia derives 12% of its foreign exchange from registration
fees. Id. A private company operates Liberia's registering authority from an office in
Reston, Virginia. See Hearing on H.R. 1126: Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Labor Standards of the Committee on Education and Labor House of Representa-
tives, 102d Cong. 1st Sess. 27 (1991) (statement of Alexander C. Cullison).
19. Pace, supra note 17. For example, a Filipino crew, by one estimate, is four
times less expensive to employ than its American counterpart. Id.
20. See House Subcommittee Revives Bogey of Maritime Labour Law, LLOYD'S
LIST (London), Oct. 10, 1992. In reference to the reportedly poor working conditions
presently endured by foreign seamen, Mr. Clay stated, "Clearly, this nation not only
has the right but the moral duty to ensure that where [foreign seamen] are engaged
primarily in the commerce of the U.S. such vestiges of 19th century servitude are erad-
icated." Id. A representative of the AFL-CIO testified before the House Committee on
Education and Labor:
The exclusion of foreign flag vessels from the jurisdiction of the National La-
bor Relations Act denies foreign flag crew members the guaranteed right to
engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection. These activi-
ties are often necessary to enable foreign crews to successfully avail them-
selves of existing U.S. laws, such as those which protect foreign seamen from
being cheated of their rightful wages....
Hearing on H.R. 1517, supra note 1, at 42 (prepared statement of Thomas J. Schnei-
der, Esq.).
21. See Hearing on H.R. 1517, supra note 1, at 43 (prepared statement of
Thomas J. Schneider, Esq.). Comparing American seamen to their foreign counter-
parts, Mr. Schneider stated that "[f]oreign crewmen, on the other hand, are subject to
many types of mistreatment, including extremely low pay for long hours of work." Id.
22. See Hearing on H.R. 1517, supra note 1, at 114 (1993) (prepared statement
of Philip J. Loree, Chairman, Federation of American Controlled Shipping) (arguing
that the application of U.S. labor laws to foreign workers would conflict with the labor
laws of most other nations).
23. See Supporters Say Bill Would Bolster the US Flag, LLOYD'S LIST, May 17,
1993. The Chairman of House subcommittee on Labor Standards, Occupational
1994]
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with FLSA and NLRA would bring "flag of convenience" carriers'
crewing expenses closer to those of U.S. flagged vessels. 24 Additionally,
NLRA's provisions regarding organization rights would provide U.S.
labor unions with the leverage necessary to pressure foreign shipowners
to employ organized labor. 5
II. JURISDICTION TO PRESCRIBE
Before examining the components of the internal economy rule, it
is useful to survey relevant general principles of sovereign jurisdiction.
The Clay Bill presents the issue of whether Congress has "jurisdiction
to prescribe" labor laws applicable to open registry vessels.2 6 Jurisdic-
tion to prescribe in the international context is the power "to make [a
nation's] laws applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons
. . . by legislation." 27 States generally derive their authority to pre-
Health and Safety, Austin Murphy, commented that the Bill "is not strictly aimed at
correcting numerous labor abuses." He added that "America needs to regain its stature
as the world's foremost economic power." This Bill would increase foreign flag ship-
owner's overhead costs and presumably bring their freight rates closer in line to that of
U.S. flagged ship owners. See id. Introducing this Bill, Representative Clay claimed
that U.S. flagged carriers are "increasingly being run off the high seas by vessels that
are not subject to enforceable labor standards and do not provide either a living wage
or humane conditions to those who have the misfortune to crew them." Clay Bill Filed
with Strong Support, LLOYD'S LIST (London), Apr. 3, 1993. According to Chairman
Philip Loree of the Federation of American-Controlled Shipping, a foreign flag ship-
owners' lobbying group, foreign flagged ships are involved in about 80% of the U.S.
liner trade, 90% of the U.S. bulk cargo trade, and 100% of the U.S. passenger trade.
House Subcommittee Revives Bogey of Maritime Labour Law, LLOYD'S LIST
(London), Oct. 10, 1992.
24. See Supporters Say Bill Would Bolster the US Flag, LLOYD'S LIST (London),
May 17, 1993.
25. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372 U.S. 10, 13 (1963) (describing a
U.S. labor union's attempt to use the NLRA to support its picketing of a flag of conve-
nience ship in order to persuade the shipowner to allow the organization of its crew).
26. See RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 401 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
27. Id. The Restatement differentiates between three types of jurisdiction under
international law:
(a) jurisdiction to prescribe, i.e., to make its laws applicable to the activi-
ties, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things,
whether by legislation, by executive act or order, by administrative rule or
regulation, or by determination of a court;
(b) jurisdiction to adjudicate, i.e., to subject persons or things to the pro-
cess of its courts or administrative tribunals, whether in civil or in criminal
proceedings, whether or not the state is a party to the proceeding;
(c) jurisdiction to enforce, i.e., to induce or compel compliance or to pun-
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scribe laws from the jurisdictional concepts of territoriality and nation-
ality.2 8 Sovereigns normally may rely on territoriality as a basis of ju-
risdiction where the regulated conduct occurs or has effect in whole or
in part within a sovereign's geographic boundaries. Emanating from a
sovereign's necessary control over conduct or persons within its bor-
ders,29 territoriality is the most common and widely accepted basis for
jurisdiction.30 Of a more modern genesis, nationality supports jurisdic-
tion where the regulated activity is that of a citizen or resident of the
regulating state. Nationality is the primary basis of prescription in
matters of status or other private law.31
Alone, the fact that a state is governing conduct on the basis of
territorial or national sovereignty is insufficient under international law;
the jurisdictional scope of the regulation in question must also be rea-
sonable.3 2 The Restatement sets forth several criteria to evaluate
ish noncompliance with its laws or regulations, whether through the courts or
by use of executive, administrative, police, or other nonjudicial action.
Id.
The Restatement's three categories of jurisdiction are a recent invention, not read-
ily discernable in older court decisions and other sources of international law. Id. pt. IV
introductory note. Although the criteria for evaluation of each category are in some
ways discrete and can lead to different results, the three jurisdictional distinctions are
interdependent and influenced by similar considerations. Id. Consequently, courts have
applied principles regarding "jurisdiction to adjudicate" in cases concerning "jurisdic-
tion to prescribe" and vise versa. Particularly when applying the ancient precepts of
maritime law, courts have spoken of the jurisdiction of laws generally. See, e.g., The
Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 369 (1885) (referring to the jurisdiction of maritime law
common to all nations).
28. RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, § 402. See id. § 402 cmt. a. Links of national-
ity or territoriality alone may be insufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction: Id. Because
both bases of jurisdiction are discrete, two nations may exercise jurisdiction over the
same matter. Id. § 402 cmt. b. When two states can reasonably exercise jurisdiction,
the state with lesser interest in the matter should defer to the state with greater inter-
est. Id. § 402 cmt. c.
29. See Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1922) (applying prohibition
laws of the United States to British passenger ships in U.S. territorial waters in order
to prevent frustration of Congressional intent).
30. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, § 402 cmt. c.
31. See id. § 402 cmt. e. See also id. § 402 reporters' note 1.
The Clay Bill purports to apply equally to foreign and U.S. shipowners and crew. See
H.R. 1517, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Therefore, Congress cannot justify its juris-
diction to extend FLSA and NLRA based on nationality. Accordingly, the validity of
the Bill must depend upon the territoriality principle. Seeming to exercise sovereign
rights of territorial jurisdiction, the Clay Bill extends FLSA and NLRA only to vessels
regularly trading with the United States, implying that such vessels are regularly pre-
sent within territory of the United States. See id.
32. RESTATEMENT, supra note 27, § 403(1). Even when a state can justify juris-
1994]
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whether an exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable.3 3 Primary evidence
that a law's jurisdictional scope is reasonable includes the strength of
the relationship of the regulated matter to territoriality or nationality,
the degree to which other nations regulate the matter, the consistency
of the regulation with international law, and the extent of another
state's interest in regulating that activity or person. 4 If the aggregate
weight of these factors suggests that a sovereign's jurisdiction over a
person or activity is reasonable, then the regulation's scope of authority
is valid under international law.35 For example, a state's exercise of
jurisdiction to regulate persons or activities wholly within its borders is
generally considered reasonable."
Despite the usefulness of this balancing test in most contexts, it
diction on the basis of nationality or territoriality, "a state may not exercise jurisdiction
to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections with another
state when exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable." Id.
33. Id. § 403(2). The relevant factors to consider when determining whether an
exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable include:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory
of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to which the activity takes place within
the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the
territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the
activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation
is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regu-
lation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such
activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is gener-
ally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that
might be protected or hurt by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal,
or economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of
the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating
the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id.
34. Id. See generally I Steven F. Friedell, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 129
(1992).
35. RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, § 403(1).
36. See, e.g., The Queen v. Jameson, 2 Q.B. 425, 430 (1896) (holding that it is
reasonable under international law to extend the Queen's laws to the activity of foreign
seamen temporarily within the territory of the United Kingdom).
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has not fared well in the maritime setting. 37 Because of the transitory
nature of ships and shipping, vessels engaged in international trade nec-
essarily travel through many territorial jurisdictions. If every state at-
tempted to impose its full territorial sovereignty upon each visiting ves-
sel, ships engaged in foreign trade would navigate through an
untenable regulatory patchwork. Likewise, if each registering state
could claim exclusive national jurisdiction over its vessels, port states
would be powerless to regulate hazardous or otherwise menacing ship-
board conduct. Consequently, international law has endeavored to de-
vise jurisdictional concepts that grant shipowners a degree of legal sta-
bility and predictability, while allowing port states to control some
aspects of visiting vessels' conduct.,38
As an initial attempt to create a suitable jurisdictional theory, a
legal fiction developed among the community of nations that a ship is a
"floating piece" of the territory of the nation whose flag it flies.39 This
principle has adequately explained the flag state's jurisdiction over its
own vessels on the high seas.'0 However, such a strict nationality-based
theory appeared to provide a visiting ship complete immunity from the
laws of the territorial sovereign."1 Reacting to this perceived inade-
quacy, the major seafaring nations have adopted the more flexible "in-
ternal economy rule."' 2
A. The Internal Economy Rule
The "internal economy rule" states that:
37. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, § 402 cmt. h. The Restatement suggests
that jurisdiction over vessels is best viewed as a basis independent of territoriality or
nationality. Id.
38. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953). International maritime
law "aims at stability and order through usages which considerations of comity, reci-
procity, and long-range interest have developed to define the domain which each nation
will claim as its own." Id.
39. See RESTATEMENT § 402 reporters' note 4. See also Scharrenberg v. Dollar
S.S. Co., 245 U.S. 122, 126 (1917) (applying U.S. laws on the basis of the "floating
piece of territory" principle); Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 123 (1923)
(distinguishing nationality of ship from territoriality as a basis for jurisdiction, stating
that nationality is adequate basis where ship is on high seas and outside the territorial
reach of any nation). But see Cunard, 262 U.S. at 132 (McReynolds, J., dissenting)
(stating that nationality is also a sufficient basis for regulation of the internal affairs of
a vessel even while it rests within territorial waters of another sovereign).
40. See Cunard, 262 U.S. at 123 (1922).
41. See Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887).
42. See THOMMEN, supra note 6, at 49-50 (1962).
1994]
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[A] foreign merchant ship is not subject to the jurisdiction of
the coastal state in matters touching only the internal order and
discipline of the ship. . . . [However, port states will] assume
jurisdiction when, in their opinion, the peace or tranquility of
the port is disturbed ..
An examination of the legal practices of the United States, the
United Kingdom, France, and other traditionally maritime nations
reveals that the internal economy rule has gained international accept-
ance." In an effort to comply with this doctrine, these port states have
relinquished their jurisdiction over visiting vessels in matters such as
wages,45 collective bargaining,4 necessary discipline,47 crimes commit-
ted on board,48 and other matters not affecting the peace or security of
the port state.49
The French and British judiciaries have each developed theories to
explain the internal economy rule. The French theory assumes that the
port state lacks competence to extend its laws to the internal economy
of foreign vessels, although these vessels may lay within a sovereign's
territorial waters. 50 This doctrine emerged from two cases involving as-
saults committed by American seamen while aboard the American flag
vessels Newton and Sally. In both cases, the defendants had physically
disciplined subordinate American crew members while in French ports.
On a consolidated appeal, the highest administrative court in France,
the Conseil d'Etat, maintained that French courts did not have the au-
thority to hear these cases as a matter of international law. It held that
claims arising on foreign ships, unless affecting the peace or tranquility
of the port state, are properly within the sole jurisdiction of the flag
43. Id. at 50 (footnotes omitted).
44. See generally THOMMEN, supra note 6, at 49-50 (1962).
45. See Su v. Southern Aster, 978 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1992) (refusing to apply
Seamen's Wage Act to foreign seamen discharged overseas).
46. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372 U.S. 10 (1963) (enjoining the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board from holding organizational elections among foreign
ship's crew).
47. See A.H. Charteris, THE LEGAL POSITION OF MERCHANTMEN IN FOREIGN
PORTS AND NATIONAL WATERS, 1920-21 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 45, 50. For example, in two
famous French cases, The Newton and The Sally, French courts withheld their juris-
diction over American seamen charged with causing injury and death in the course of
administering discipline aboard ship. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953) (holding that Jones Act provi-
sions for recovery in personal injury cases did not apply to a foreign seamen).
50. Charteris, supra note 47, at 46.
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state. 1
Later, a similar case came before French courts in which an
American seaman murdered a fellow crewmember aboard the Ameri-
can vessel Tempest.5 2 A French court found that under these circum-
stances it could exercise jurisdiction. The court distinguished this case
from The Newton and The Sally on the basis that, among other factors
relating to the order of the port, the ship's master had requested the
assistance of local authorities to quell disturbances arising out of the
American seaman's offense s.5  The principle developed by these deci-
sions is that a port state cannot exercise jurisdiction unless it finds that
the illegal conduct has sufficiently disturbed the port state's interests.54
The British system, on the other hand, acknowledges the port
state's potential jurisdiction over all the internal affairs of a foreign
ship.55 In Forbes v. Cochrane,56 for example, an English court consid-
ered the status of slaves that had escaped from America aboard a Brit-
ish ship.57 The court held that the slaves were free once the ship left
the territorial waters of the United States. At that point, the laws of
the United States no longer permeated the ship, hence the law of the
ship's flag, which forbade slavery, regained its supremacy. 58
In The Queen v. Keyn,59 the English further refined their interpre-
tation of the internal economy rule. In this case, the court heard a
criminal charge that a foreign national aboard a foreign ship had col-
lided with and sank a British ship in British territorial waters.60 Rea-
soning that any criminal conduct that may have occurred took place
aboard the foreign vessel, the court dismissed the case by holding that
51. Id. at 51. For a translation of the decision see id. at 50. See PHILIP C. JESSUP,
THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 145-46 (1927) (ex-
plaining the significance of the French cases The Newton and The Sally).
52. Charteris, supra note 47, at 53.
53. See id. at 53. See also JESSUP, supra note 1, at 147 (explaining the court's
decision in the case of The Tempest).
54. A significant number of seafaring nations have adopted some form of the
French system, including Italy, Belgium, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Portu-
gal, Russia, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. See JESSUP, supra note 51, at
154-68.
55. See Charteris, supra note 47, at 65.
56. Forbes v. Cochrane, K.B. 2 B. & C. 448, 467 (1824).
57. Id.
58. Id. See also JESSUP, supra note 51, at 169 (noting that the British vessel con-
cerned was a warship and therefore was more likely to have been immune from local
jurisdiction than a merchant vessel).
59. The Queen v. Keyn, 2 Ex.D. 63, 64 (1876).
60. Id.
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the law of the flag controlled.6" Explaining this result, Sir Phillimore
recognized that the port state, "influenced by considerations of public
policy or by treaty, [may] choose to forego the exercise of her law over
the foreign vessel and crew, or exercise it only when they disturb the
peace and good order of the port." 26 Through these cases, the British
version of the internal economy rule has come to mean that while the
port state retains authority to extend its laws to the internal affairs of a
foreign vessel, it should not exercise this authority unless the conduct
has sufficiently affected the port state's interest.
The French and the English interpretations diverge, therefore,
only on the issue of whether the internal economy rule, as a doctrine of
international law, can remove a sovereign's jurisdiction or merely influ-
ence against its exercise. 3 Although this conceptual difference exists,
both systems leave to the port state the common threshold decision of
whether the shipboard conduct is sufficiently disturbing to the port
state as to justify intrusion into a vessel's internal affairs. Conse-
quently, in practice both theories lead to the same general principle:"
Port states should not exercise jurisdiction over the internal economy of
a foreign vessel unless, by a determination of the port state, special
circumstances suggest that the exercise is reasonable.6 5
The community of nations has accepted the general principle of
the internal economy rule as an obligation under international law. 6
61. Id. at 86.
62. Id. at 82. Sir Phillimore regarded this position as consistent with the French
practice, if not the theory. Id.
63. See Charteris, supra note 47, at 64-65 (noting dicta in English cases which
suggests that matters of the internal economy of a foreign vessel while in English ports
are to be left to the jurisdiction of the flag ship so long as these matters do not affect
the port state).
64. See THOMMEN, supra note 6, at 49-50. Regarding the differences between the
two theories, Thommen commented:
Despite the theoretical distinctions, there is hardly any substantial difference
between the French system and the British system. Under both systems, the
sovereignty of the coastal state is recognized over its internal waters. There is
also a general agreement among nations following either system that the local
sovereign is free to exercise jurisdiction over foreign ships in respect of mat-
ters, the consequences of which extend beyond the ship.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also JESSUP, supra note 51, at 191-192 (comparing the
practical outcomes of the French and British theories).
65. THOMMEN, supra note 6, at 50.
66. International law may develop from generally accepted and followed practices
of states, international agreements, and, as a supplementary source, "derivation[s]
from general principles common to the major legal systems of the world." RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 26. Section 102 of the Restatement reads:
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Accordingly, the practical differences among nations is not to which
theoretical interpretation each adheres, but rather what each territorial
sovereign considers sufficiently consequential shipboard conduct to sup-
port the port state's invasion into a visiting vessel's internal affairs.
B. The Internal Economy Rule in the United States
The United States, credited as a subscriber to the British theory,
has accepted the internal economy doctrine as an obligation imposed by
international law. In the tradition of British interpretation, the Su-
preme Court of the United States has long held that when a foreign
Sources of International Law
(1) A rule of international law is one that has
been accepted as such by the international community of states
(a) in the form of customary law;
(b) by international agreement; or
(c) by derivation from general principles common to the major
legal systems of the world.
(2) Customary international law results from a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of obligation.
(3) International agreements create law for the states parties thereto and
may lead to the creation of customary international law when such agree-
ments are intended for adherence by states generally and are in fact widely
accepted.
(4) General principles common to the major legal systems, even if not
incorporated or reflected in customary law or international agreements, may
be invoked as supplementary rules of international law where appropriate.
See Article 38 of Statute of the International Court of Justice. Article 38 reads, in
part:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, es-
tablishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice ac-
cepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
Id.
Customary law develops where nations follow a rule consistently and with a sense
of legal obligation. Restatement, supra note 26, § 102(2). See id. cmt. b; id. cmt. c.
The "best evidence" that a rule has developed into customary international law is evi-
dence of consistent state practice. Id. § 103 cmt. a.
67. See Alexander M. Bickel, Strathearn S.S. Co. v. Dillon -An Unpublished
Opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1956) (describing
generally the U.S. theory regarding the application of domestic laws to foreign ships).
See also Charteris, supra note 47, at 45-46 (considering the United States as adhering
to the British system except in instances where jurisdictional relationships are governed
by treaty).
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merchant ship voluntarily enters the territorial waters of another coun-
try, the vessel subjects itself to the jurisdiction of that country."8 The
Court has viewed the foreign ship's acceptance of local jurisdiction as a
condition of entry. 9 Recognizing that international comity may curtail
an exercise of this jurisdiction, it has further stated that a port state's
application of domestic law to conduct aboard a foreign vessel should
comply with the internal economy rule.7 0 Through the numerous appli-
cations of the internal economy rule, the United States judiciary has
developed principles defining the limits of port state jurisdiction. 1 In so
doing, United States courts have characterized their decisions as con-
sistent with international law.
72
The Supreme Court explained the United States' adherence to the
internal economy rule over a century ago.7 3 In Wildenhus's Case,7' the
68. See The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 364 (1885) (noting that treaty obligations
regarding waiving jurisdiction "should be fairly and faithfully observed"). The Court
will observe treaties that relinquish domestic authority of foreign vessels. See The
Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon (The Exchange), 7 Cranch 114 (1812). Chief Justice
Marshall stated that "It]he jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is neces-
sarily exclusive and absolute." Id. at 133. See also Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 100 (1923). The Cunard Court reiterated this principle, stating that "[diuring [a
foreign flagged vessel's] stay she is entitled to the protection of the laws of that place
and correlatively is bound to yield obedience to them." Id. at 124.
69. See Strathearn S.S. Co. v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 607 (1920) (explaining the appli-
cation of the Seamen's Wage Act); Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U.S. 169 (1903)
(explaining the application of Seamen's Act of 1884 to foreign flagged vessels); The
Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 364 (1885); The Epsom, 227 F. 158 (W.D. Wash. 1915)
(explaining the application of the Seamen's Wage Act of 1915 to foreign flagged ves-
sels); The Ester, 190 F. 216 (E.D.S.C. 1911). However, this jurisdiction may endure
even if the cause of action arose on the high seas. Id. at 221.
70. See The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 364 (1885); The Exchange, 7 Cranch 114,
136 (1812). See generally, 1 Steven F. Friedell, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 129
(1992).
71. See The Ester, 190 F. 216 (E.D.S.C. 1911) (setting forth a comprehensive list
of elements to consider when deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction). See generally
Martin J. Norris, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 4.5 (4th ed. 1985).
72. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963) (recognizing a
"well-established rule of international law that the law of the flag state ordinarily gov-
erns the internal affairs of a ship"). See also Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1, 12 (1887)
(stating that internal economy rule is "general public law").
73. Much of the earlier U.S. case law on port state jurisdiction over foreign flag
ships involved crimes committed by crew aboard the vessel. Because serious crimes,
such as murder, were considered punishable at common law (i.e., common to the laws
of all civilized nations), the issue was which country had jurisdiction to punish the
actor. See Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887). In other situations, such as collisions
at sea, the court might assume jurisdiction but apply the "general maritime law" of
nations. See The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 370 (1885). As the amount of national
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Court recognized that, as a principle of international law, local courts
should normally decline to apply domestic law to matters internal to a
foreign vessel. The Court noted an exception where the conduct affects
the peace of the port state.7 5 In this case, New Jersey law enforcement
officers arrested a Belgian seaman for the murder of another Belgian
aboard a Belgian flagged vessel docked in Jersey City. The Belgian
counsel sought the seaman's release upon a writ of habeas corpus, cit-
ing a treaty between the United States and Belgium under which "con-
sular agents shall have exclusive charge of the internal order of
merchant vessels of their nation." However, the treaty did not preserve
the flag state's authority in instances where the matter disturbed the
"tranquillity and public order on shore or in the port."17 6 Chief Justice
Waite, considering many similar treaties and practices of other na-
tions, 7 observed that:
by comity it came to be generally understood among civilized
nations that all matters of discipline, and all things done on
board, which affected only the vessel, or those belonging to her,
and did not involve the peace or tranquility of the country, or
the tranquillity of the port, should be left by the local govern-
ment to be dealt with by the authorities of the nation to which
the vessel belonged as the laws of that nation, or the interests of
its commerce should require.78
The Court concluded that the United States did have jurisdiction
over this particular shipboard conduct. Using language similar to that
legislation in maritime law increased, U.S. courts began to make more "choice of law"
decisions. See The Epson, 227 F. 158 (W.D. Wash. 1915) (applying British law to a
wage claim brought by American and foreign seamen against a British vessel). See
also Brooks v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 809 F.2d 206 (3rd Cir. 1987) (applying Liberian
labor law to a wage dispute with a Liberian flagged vessel although the employer,
seamen, waters, union, and collective bargaining agreement were all American).
74. 120 U.S. 1 (1887).
75. Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. at 13.
76. Id. at 18.
77. According to Chief Justice Waite, the first such treaty waiving the United
States' jurisdiction over foreign flagged vessels in its territory was with France (1788).
The United States later entered into similar agreements with Prussia (1828), Russia
(1832), Greece (1837), Hanover (1840), Portugal (1840), Mecklenburg-Schwerin
(1847), Oldenburg (1847), Austria (1848), New Grenada (1850), Hanseatic republics
(1852), the Two Sicilies (1855), Denmark (1861), Dominican Republic (1867), Italy
(1868), Belgium (1868), the German Empire (1871), the Netherlands (1878), Italy
(1881), and Romania (1881). See id. at 14.
78. Id. at 12.
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relied on by the French in deciding the Tempest,7 the Supreme Court
explained that murder inherently falls within the "tranquility of the
port" exception, established both by the treaty with Belgium and gen-
eral international law. First, the grave nature of this offense itself cre-
ates a disturbance sufficient to breach the peace of the port.80 Secondly,
the civilized nations of the world universally and severely punish per-
sons for the crime of murder.8' Lastly, the Court considered this ap-
proach to be consistent with the practices of other nations.82
The Court's characterization of the internal economy rule as one
of "comity" has led to some confusion. A number of writers have un-
derstood this to mean that the internal economy rule is but a courtesy
between nations, not a duty imposed by law.8" On the contrary, legal
scholars and U.S. courts regard international comity as a binding legal
obligation.8 A closer analysis of the Court's reasoning in Wildenhus's
Case also suggests that the Court considered itself bound to adhere to
the internal economy rule as a matter of international law. First, the
Court chronicled the widespread proliferation of similar treaties grant-
ing consular jurisdiction over foreign vessels in territorial waters.8 In-
ternational law recognizes that such a "network" of similar treaties can
lead to state practice and thus obligation under international law. 88
Second, the Court viewed its decision as consistent with the judicial
and legislative practices of other nations.87 Reinforcing the premise
79. Charteris, supra note 47, at 53.
80. Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. at 18. The severity of some offenses are enough to
"affect the community at large, and consequently to invoke the power of the local gov-
ernment." Id.
81. Id. at 18. Murder creates a public disturbance that "every civilized nation
considers itself bound to provide a severe punishment for when committed within its
own jurisdiction." Id. at 17-18.
82. Id. In particular, the Court emphasized that considering murder a per se
breach of the peace is consistent with practice of France. Id.
83. See 2 D.P. O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 942 (1984).
See also Bickel, supra note 67, at 1185 (concluding that the Court in Wildenhus's
Case disregarded the provisions of the Belgian treaty in exercising jurisdiction over the
defendant).
84. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, § 101 cmt. e (noting that international
comity is neither a matter of pure courtesy nor of absolute legal obligation). See also
id. § 403 cmt. a (regarding reasonableness of jurisdiction as a legal obligation as a
practice of international comity).
85. Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1, 13-15. Many similar treaties exist today. See
MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 4.4 (1985).
86. RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, § 102 cmt. i.
87. Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. at 18 (comparing its decision to the practices of
France).
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that the United States has accepted this rule as law, the Supreme
Court has consistently referred to the internal economy rule as an in-
ternational obligation in its decisions subsequent to Wildenhus's
Case88
III. APPLICATION OF THE INTERNAL ECONOMY RULE IN THE
UNITED STATES
As previously noted,8" the internal economy rule grants discretion
to the port state to determine what circumstances warrant the invasion
of a foreign ship's internal economy.90 Therefore, a survey of the in-
stances when the United States permitted or forbade the exercise of
jurisdiction over the internal affairs of foreign vessels should be used to
define that threshold. Accordingly, proponents of the Clay Bill point to
several statutes under which Congress has seemingly extended domestic
laws to govern the internal affairs of foreign vessels visiting the United
States. These writers contend that the apparent jurisdiction of these
laws delineate the boundaries of the United States' prescriptive reach
under the internal economy rule.91
Although many of these statutes contain sweeping jurisdictional
language, the courts have limited their scope to conform with the inter-
nal economy doctrine where the tools of statutory construction permit.
In construing these statutes, the courts have presumed that Congress
does not intend to violate international law absent clear evidence to the
contrary. 92 Consequently, these constrictive judicial interpretations, not
88. See, e.g., International Longshoremen's Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co.,
397 U.S. 195, 199 (1970) (quoting McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372 U.S. 10, 21
(1963)) (regarding internal economy rule as well founded in international law).
89. See supra, note 41 and accompanying text.
90. See JESSUP, supra note 51, at 191-92. Wildenhus's Case implies the United
States "in every case [will] determine for itself whether a particular incident has af-
fected the peace and tranquility of the port, even though there is actually no distur-
bance thereof." Id.
91. See Hearing on H.R. 1517, supra note 1, at 44-49 (prepared statement of
Thomas J. Schneider, Esq.).
92. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 27, § 155 cmt. a. See also EEOC v. Arabian
American Oil Co., 111 S.Ct. 1227 (1991) (limiting the extra-territorial reach of U.S.
civil rights legislation); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953) (limiting the jurisdic-
tional scope of the Jones Act to exclude some seamen on foreign vessels); Su v. M/V
Southern Aster, 978 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1992) (limiting the jurisdictional reach of the
Seamen's Wage Act). See generally RESTATEMENT § 114. The Court follows Lord
Russell of Killowen in The Queen v. Jameson, 2 Q.B. 425, 430 (1896) ("if any con-
struction otherwise be possible, an Act will not be construed as applying to foreigners
in respect to acts done by them outside the dominions of the sovereign power enact-
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the statutes themselves, truly reflect the international legal obligations
of the United States. Therefore, where the judiciary has reformed gen-
erous jurisdictional language in maritime statutes, it has identified the
circumstances under which the United States may or may not legally
intervene in the internal economy of a visiting ship.93
As the following examination reveals, the methods and reasoning
employed by the judiciary to limit the scope of broad jurisdictional
statutes reveal a common rationale: The United States will interfere
with the internal economy of a foreign vessel only where the absence of
port state regulation would place a direct burden on the United States
or where the United States has a special duty to safeguard the welfare
of the class of persons protected by the statute. Absent one or both of
these purposes, U.S. courts have declined to construe statutory lan-
guage to cover foreign ships or crew where, as with the Clay Bill, the
purpose of regulation is to improve U.S. competitiveness or satisfy
some sense of general altruism.
A. The Jones Act
The Jones Act is perhaps the clearest example of the Supreme
Court's efforts to contain Congress' apparent effort to evade the inter-
nal economy rule. Its language contains perhaps the most broad juris-
dictional wording of any maritime statute. 94 According to the text of
the statute, the Jones Act provides certain legal remedies to "[a]ny
seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employ-
ment.' 95 By liberally wording the statute, "Congress has extended our
law and opened our courts to all alien seafaring men injured anywhere
in the world in the service of watercraft of every foreign nation." 96 Be-
cause Congress used tools of statutory construction to limit the Jones
Act's jurisdiction, the Court assumed that Congress would not intend
to legislate in violation of international law, absent a clear indication to
ing"). Id.
93. See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 382
(1959). Considering the proper scope of U.S. maritime law, the Court reasoned that
"in the absence of a contrary congressional direction, we must apply those principles of
choice of law that are consonant with the needs of a general federal law and with due
recognition of our self regarding respect for the relevant interests of foreign nations in
the regulation of maritime commerce as part of the legitimate concern of the interna-
tional community." Id. (emphasis added).
94. See 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988).
95. Id.
96. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 577 (1953).
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the contrary.9
Interpreting the statute so that it would comply with the United
States' obligations under the internal economy rule, the Court devised
a "points of contact" balancing test.98 By the Supreme Court's decision
in Lauritzen v. Larsen,99 the Jones Act applies to a particular injured
seaman only where the following "connecting" factors point to the
Act's reasonable exercise: 1) place of the wrongful act, 2) flag of the
vessel, 3) allegiance or domicile of the injured seaman, 4) allegiance of
the defendant shipowner, 5) place of the contract, 6) inaccessibility of
a foreign forum, 7) law of the forum, and 8) shipowner's base of
operations. 100
The Court has weighted these factors to further restrain the juris-
diction of the Jones Act to comply with international law. In formulat-
ing the balancing test, the Court accorded the law of the flag the most
weight. 10 1 This reflects the rule of international law that the flag state
has the primary responsibility for the welfare of the seamen onboard its
vessels. 102 Likewise, the balancing test considers the residence of the
97. Id. at 577. Congress passed the Jones Act "with regard to a seasoned body of
maritime law developed by the experience of American courts long accustomed to deal-
ing with admiralty problems in reconciling our own with foreign interests and in ac-
commodating the reach of our own laws to those of other maritime nations." Id.
98. Id. at 582. The Court has used the principles of that case to guide the United
States in the application of maritime law generally. Romero v. International Operating
Co., 358 U.S. 354, 382 (1959).
99. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
100. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 583-84, 586-89 (1953). The Court added
the last factor, base of the shipowner's operations, in 1970. See Hellenic Lines v.
Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 319 (1970). These criteria are to guide in the application of mari-
time law generally. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354,
382 (1959).
101. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 585 (noting that "the weight given to the ensign over-
bears most other connecting events in determining applicable law").
102. See id. at 584. See also ILO Convention (No. 147) Concerning Minimum
Standards in Merchant Ships, Oct. 29, 1976, art 2. This multilateral treaty assigns the
responsibility for the welfare of seamen to the flag state. ILO 147 reads in pertinent
part:
Each Member which ratifies this Convention undertakes -
(a) to have laws or regulations laying down, for ships registered in its terri-
tory -
(i) safety standards, including ... hours of work and manning...
(ii) appropriate social security measure; and
(iii) shipboard conditions of employment . . .
(b) to exercise effective jurisdiction or control over ships which are registered
in its territory in respect of -
(i) safety standards, including ... hours of work and manning, pre-
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injured seaman an important consideration because "each nation has a
legitimate interest that its nationals and permanent inhabitants be not
[sic] maimed or disabled from self-support." 103 Otherwise, an injured
American seaman would necessarily rely on the resources of the United
States for support without an adequate remedy against his employer."0 4
Therefore, the balancing test's two most influential factors support the
Act's jurisdiction where the United States has a special duty to protect
a particular injured seaman or the unavailability of redress for an in-
jured seaman would burden the United States. 10 5
To assure a bona fide connection between the injured seaman and
the United States, the balancing test indicates that a seaman should
not benefit from the protection of the Jones Act simply because the
ship on which he is injured happens to trade with the United States.
For example, although the lex loci is the primary jurisdictional consid-
eration in a normal tort action, the Jones Act test accords the factor
little weight. 06 The Court reasoned that, because ships travel in and
out of numerous territorial jurisdictions, the place of the wrongful act
is a fortuitous factor. 07 It would be manifestly unreasonable to justify
interference with the internal affairs of a ship based on such a fortui-
tous factor.'018 Further explaining this valuation, Justice Jackson ob-
served that "[a] seaman takes his employment, like his fun, where he
finds it.. .""' Accordingly, the place of the wrongful act "is modified
by the more constant law of the flag. '"O
The balancing test also indicates that the Jones Act should not
extend to foreign seamen solely as a subsidy for U.S. flagged carriers.
First, although the shipowner's U.S. citizenship or base of operations
may weigh in favor of applying the Act, the Court has intimated that
scribed by national laws or regulations;
(ii) social security measures prescribed by national laws or
regulations;
(iii) shipboard conditions of employment ... prescribed by national
laws of regulations, or laid down by competent courts in a manner
equally binding on the shipowners and seafarers concerned.
Id. (emphasis added).
103. Larsen, 345 U.S. at 586.
104. Id.
105. Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditas, 398 U.S. 306, 318 (1970) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting) (reasoning that the government which is responsible for the welfare of a par-
ticular seaman should exercise jurisdiction).
106. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 583.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 584.
109. Id. at 588.
110. Id. at 584.
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these considerations should tip the balance only in close cases."' This
is consistent with the principle of international law that a state may
regulate the conduct of its nationals insofar as the regulation does not
infringe on the sovereign rights of another state.11 2 Second, the "place
of the contract" factor carries little weight, because it, like the place of
injury, is a fortuitous factor.'" Discounting the value of the lex loci
contractus removes the effect of the "increasing costs" factor for ship-
owners who sign on foreign seamen in U.S. ports." 4
Other elements of the balancing test also suggest that the Jones
Act should not extend to foreign vessels out of general benevolence to-
wards seamen. For instance, the inaccessibility of a more suitable fo-
rum influences the Court's decision whether to retain jurisdiction, not
whether to apply the liberal personal injury laws of the United
States." 5 Similarly, the "law of the forum" factor suggests that the
United States should not entitle an injured foreign seaman to a wind-
fall under the laws of the United States simply because the shipowner
is amenable to local jurisdiction."'
Although the Jones Act appears on the surface to extend the scope
of U.S. domestic laws even farther than the Clay Bill extends it, the
Supreme Court's decisions have instead narrowed the scope of the
Jones Act. In so doing, the Supreme Court has effectively narrowed the
111. See id. at 586. See Demateos v. Texaco, 562 F.2d 895, 901 (3rd Cir. 1977)
(regarding law of the flag as outweighing base of operations). But see Southern Cross
S.S. Co. v. Firipis, 285 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1960) (disregarding law of the flag where
only contacts with the United States were American citizens and permanent resident
stock ownership of foreign incorporated company operating foreign flag vessel).
112. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 586 (1953). Upon application of the
Jones Act, where a showing of the other interests is strong enough to overcome the law
of the flag, does not violate international law because "[a] state 'is not debarred by any
rule of international law from governing the conduct of its own citizens upon the high
seas or even in foreign countries when the rights of other nations or their national are
not infringed.'" Id. at 587 (quoting Skiriotes v. Florida, 61 S.Ct. 924, 927 (1941)).
113. Id. at 588 (reasoning that to give weight to the place of the contract would
"subject a ship to a multiple of systems of law, to put some of the crew in a more
advantageous position than others....
114. See id. at 588.
115. Id. at 590 (reasoning that the potential expense and effort for the litigants to
bring the controversy before a more suitable forum affects the court's decision whether
to exercise its jurisdiction, not whether the laws of the United States should apply to
the controversy).
116. Id. at 591 (reasoning that "U]urisdiction of maritime cases in all countries is
so wide and the nature of its subject matter so far-flung that there would be no justifi-
cation for altering the law of a controversy just because local jurisdiction of the parties
is obtainable").
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scope of U.S. domestic laws. Of course, some vessels covered by the
Clay Bill may satisfy the "point-of-contacts" balancing test. However,
one can easily imagine a foreign flagged vessel with a foreign crew reg-
ularly trading with the United States with fewer contacts than would
subject it to the jurisdiction of the Jones Act. 1" Moreover, the Court's
reasoning in restricting the Jones Act's reach reveals that the Clay
Bill's dual purposes, subsidizing the U.S. fleet and creating rights for
foreign seamen, do not comport with U.S. obligations under interna-
tional law.118
B. The Seamen's Wage Act
Seamen's Wage Act cases are another instance where the judici-
ary has tempered the seemingly expansive jurisdiction of a maritime
statute.1 19 The Act requires the master of a vessel to make full and
timely payment of wages after the discharge of seamen or cargo.12 0 In
jurisdictional language more restrictive than that of the Jones Act, the
Seamen's Wage Act extends its protection "to a seaman on a foreign
vessel when in a harbor of the United States." 121 Further, Congress
declared "[t]he courts [of the United States] are available to [foreign
seamen] for the enforcement of this section.' 22
Regarding wages as an internal affair, 12 3 courts have restricted the
jurisdictional scope of the Seamen's Wage Act to comply with the
United States' obligations under the internal economy rule.' 2 As with
117. For example, a foreign owned vessel regularly lightering offshore, the crew of
which has never set foot in the U.S., would be covered by the Clay Bill, but clearly not
be subject to the Jones Act.
118. The Court explicitly rejected the injured seaman's amicus-brief argument
that the balancing test ought to weigh in favor of application where the extension
would benefit seamen generally and increase the competitiveness of U.S. flagged carri-
ers. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 593.
119. See, e.g., Romero, 358 U.S. 354.
120. 46 U.S.C. § 10310 (1994).
121. Id. § 10313(i).
122. Id.
123. See Jose v. M/V Fir Grove, 801 F. Supp 358, 373 (D. Or. 1991), affd Su v.
M/V Southern Aster, 978 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1992) (regarding wages as within the
internal economy rule). See also 1 Steven F. Friedell, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 128
(1992) (characterizing wages as a function of the internal economy of a vessel).
124. See Su v. M/V Southern Aster, 978 F.2d 462, 470 (9th Cir. 1992) (conclud-
ing that Seamen's Wage Act fails to overcome the presumption that Congressional
intent is that statutes are to be construed as consistent with concepts of international
law). See also Matise v. American Foreign S.S. Co., 488 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1974),
rev'd 423 U.S. 150 (1975) (applying the Seamen's Wage Act to American seamen
discharged in a foreign port).
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the judicial construction of the Jones Act,1"" the methods and reasoning
the courts have employed in Seamen's Wage Act cases also reveal the
outer bounds of the United States' jurisdiction over foreign vessels. 1 2
These limitations embrace the same rationale as the Jones Act balanc-
ing test, though adopting a less complicated inquiry. Like the Jones
Act cases, the judiciary's analysis permits the domestic laws of the
United States to invade a foreign ship only where a seaman's discharge
would directly burden the port or where the seaman's welfare is a spe-
cial responsibility of the United States.
This judicial construction of the Seamen's Wage Act jurisdiction
clearly entitles American seamen to the protections of the Act regard-
less of the country where each may be discharged. 12 7 This broad cover-
age is consistent with the United States' duty of primary responsibility
for the welfare of its nationals. Like the reasoning employed in the
Jones Act test that gave heavy weight to the connecting factor of citi-
zenship, the United States would be burdened if American seamen re-
turned home without receiving the pay due them.
In contrast, the Seamen's Wage Act protects foreign seamen only
if discharged in a U.S. port. " This interpretation tolerates intrusion
into the internal affairs of a foreign vessel only in situations where the
vessel's conduct might otherwise place a direct burden on the port
state. For example, a foreign seaman discharged without his pay could
be stranded in the United States and dependent upon the resources of
this country to find his way home.12 9
The Clay Bill's intended reach exceeds the judicial restraints on
the jurisdiction of the Seaman's Wage Act. The Bill extends FLSA's
minimum wage to all foreign seamen on "flag of convenience" vessels
regardless of whether a particular seaman's lower rate of pay would
impose directly upon the resources of the United States.'80 Instead, un-
like burdensome situations which the Seamen's Wage Act may legiti-
mately prohibit, the Clay Bill extends its protection to foreign seamen
125. See supra note 95, and accompanying text.
126. See Romero, 358 U.S. at 384, supra note 119.
127. See Su v. M/V Southern Aster, 767 F. Supp. 205, 210 (D. Or. 1990).
128. See id. at 471 (holding that the Seamen's Wage Act does not apply to for-
eign seamen discharged in a foreign port). A few courts, however, have held that for-
eign seamen discharged in a foreign port may seek redress for unpaid wages through
the Seamen's Wage Act. See Ventiadis v. C.J. Thibodeaux & Co., 295 F. Supp. 135
(S.D. Tex. 1968).
129. See Jose v. M/V Fir Grove, 801 F. Supp. 358, 362 (D. Or. 1992) (explaining
that the Seamen's Wage Act's limited extension to foreign seamen assures that these
seamen will not be set ashore by the vessel without adequate means of support).
130. H.R. 1517, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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out of legislative goodwill.
An unpublished opinion by Justice Brandeis further works to dis-
tinguish the Clay Bill from the Seamen's Wage Act.131 Justice Bran-
deis, considering the internal economy rule, noted that the wages sub-
ject to the Seaman's Wage Act are already earned by the seaman."3 2
The Wage Act merely made due a liability previously incurred by the
shipowner through his contract with the seaman.' The Clay Bill, on
the other hand, creates new liabilities for the shipowner outside of the
employment contract. For example, FLSA's minimum wage provision
regulates the rate at which a shipowner shall pay its seamen despite an
employment contract to the contrary.' 3 4
C. Prohibition Cases
At first glance, the Supreme Court's decision that prohibition laws
extend to visiting foreign vessels lends support to the legality of the
Clay Bill. In Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon,'3 ' the Supreme Court held
that the 18th Amendment and related laws prohibited foreign ships in
U.S. territorial waters from possessing or serving alcoholic bever-
ages."' This holding appears to announce that the United States' obli-
gations under the internal economy rule permit the U.S. to condition
access to its ports on foreign ships' acceptance of all domestic laws. A
closer look at the Court's reasoning, however, reveals a more restrictive
approach.
There are two possible interpretations of this holding with respect
to the United States' obligations under the internal economy rule. Both
fall short of establishing a precedent upon which to justify the legality
of the intrusions into the internal economy envisioned by the Clay Bill.
First, Cunard could represent another set of circumstances that
justify U.S. intrusion into the internal affairs of a foreign vessel. Under
this view, the decision stands for the proposition that a port state may
interfere with the internal economy of a foreign vessel if the shipboard
conduct would "embarrass [the domestic law's] enforcement and ...
defeat the attainment of its obvious purpose.""37 In Cunard, the Court
was concerned that if it did not interpret the 18th Amendment to pro-
131. See Bickel, supra note 67, at 1177.
132. Id. at 1186.
133. Id.,
134. See H.R. 1517, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
135. 262 U.S. 100 (1923).
136. Id. at 100.
137. Id. at 126.
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hibit the carriage of alcoholic beverages by foreign ships calling at U.S.
ports, then the foreign ships' effective immunity would encourage cus-
toms violations. 13 8 In other words, it was concerned that the peace and
order of United States ports were at stake. Acting to frustrate smug-
gling into the territory of the United States is certainly not analogous
to the Clay Bill's exportation of American labor standards to foreign
seamen onboard foreign ships.
The second interpretation is that Congress had legislated in viola-
tion of international law. It is a settled principle of U.S. law that the
judiciary will follow the clearly expressed intent of Congress without
regard to the mandates of international law. 13 9 Where the courts can-
not fairly construe a statute as consistent with international law, Con-
gress' expressed intent prevails despite the nation's contrary interna-
tional obligations." 0 However, a sovereign's statutory repudiation of an
obligation under international law does not relieve it from the interna-
tional consequences of that violation.1 41
To further support this second interpretation of Cunard, it is use-
ful to note the reaction of the community of nations to the announce-
ment that prohibition laws would apply to their vessels. The United
Kingdom stated that, although it also recognized the right to condition
entry of foreign vessels, international comity restricted such conditions
to matters that "relate solely to the safety and welfare of the ship,
crew, and passengers. 1 42 The Netherlands also referred to the law as a
138. Id.
139. In his dissent, Justice Sutherland maintained that Congress was not explicit
in its intended application. He pointed out that the Amendment could have been con-
strued to not apply to these foreign vessels and that international law required the
court to so construe. Id. at 132. (Sutherland, J., dissenting). He further reasoned that
"interference with the purely internal affairs of a foreign ship is of so delicate a nature,
so full of possibilities of international misunderstandings and so likely to invite retalia-
tion that an affirmative conclusion in respect thereof should rest upon nothing less than
the clearly expressed intention of Congress." Id. at 133. (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
140. RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, § 115 cmt. a; Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 100 (1923) (holding that congressional intent is sufficiently clear to apply prohibi-
tion laws to foreign vessels in U.S. waters). The Constitution confers upon Congress the
power "[tlo regulate Commerce with foreign Nations") U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
See Cunard S.S. Co., at 262 U.S. at 133 (1923) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (stating
that the judiciary will violate international law only if that is the expressed intent of
Congress). But see DeMateos v. Texaco, 562 F.2d 895 (3rd Cir. 1977) (reasoning that
the Fifth Amendment due process requirements may preclude congressional extension
of legislation in violation of international law).
141. RESTATEMENT § 115(b).
142. See JEssup, supra note 51, at 222.
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violation of "international usage and practice."1 3 In particular, the
Dutch complained that U.S. prohibition laws contravened their na-
tional laws that required shipowners to supply seamen with a certain
ration of alcohol."" Belgian, Italian, Norwegian and Portuguese gov-
ernment statements also claimed that the United States' extension of
Prohibition to their ships violated principles of international law.14 5
For the Clay Bill, the holding of Cunard simply means that,
should Congress decide to explicitly extend FLSA and NLRA to for-
eign vessels, the judiciary will apply the statute without regard to the
United States' obligations under international law.
D. The National Labor Relations Act
The Supreme Court has already decided that the application of
the National Labor Relations Act to foreign vessels violates the United
States' obligations under the internal economy rule.
In McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional,"' a Honduran shipowner
sought to enjoin the National Labor Relations Board's Regional Direc-
tor from conducting organizational elections among its Honduran flag-
ged vessels' Honduran crew.14 7 Examining the language of the statute,
the Court found "no basis for a construction which would exert United
States jurisdiction over and apply its laws to the internal management
and affairs of the vessels ... contrary to the recognition long afforded
them not only by our state department but also by the Congress." 48
Relying on Wildenhus' Case to buttress this conclusion, the Court cited
"the well-established rule of international law that the law of the flag
ordinarily governs the internal affairs of a ship. '"149
143. See id.
144. See id. at 223.
145. See id. at 223-27.
146. 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
147. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
148. Id. at 20 (footnotes omitted).
149. Id. at 21. In Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, a Panamanian shipping
company sought damages from three American unions that had disrupted the opera-
tions of its Liberian flagged, European crewed vessel in Oregon. Union picketing of
these vessels began in support of the ship's crew who had demanded increased wages
and improved living conditions. 353 U.S. 138, 140 (1957). The unions argued that the
dispute fell within the jurisdiction of the Labor Management Relations Act. id. at 141.
The Ninth Circuit held that the dispute was outside of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act because the Act is solely concerned with the welfare of American workers.
Accordingly, the Circuit Court found for the shipping company under an Oregon com-
mon law principle regarding picketing for unlawful purposes. The Supreme Court,
holding that the Act does not apply to foreign vessels because Congress had not clearly
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In International Longshoremen's Local 1416 v. Ariadne Ship-
ping,150 Panamanian and Liberian vessels registered in those countries
brought an action to enjoin union picketing of their ships in Florida. 151
In this case, the unions were protesting substandard wages paid by the
shipping companies to American longshoremen involved in the periodic
husbanding of these foreign ships.' 52 Distinguishing this case from Mc-
Culloch and its progeny, the Court held that the NLRA did apply to
this dispute because "[tlhere is no evidence that these occasional work-
ers were involved in any internal affairs of either ship which would be
governed by foreign law[s]."' 53 In other words, it was reasonable to
expect that the labor laws of the United States should apply to domes-
tic longshoremen. 15
The Court further explained U.S. obligations under international
law in Windward Shipping v. American Radio Ass'n.155 As in the other
two cases, an American union directed activity towards two foreign
flagged ships docked in a U.S. port. This time, however, the union did
not try to organize the crew as in McCulloch or increase wages for
American residents as in Ariadne.156 Instead, the union sought to apply
pressure to the shipping companies to increase the wages of foreign
seamen under contracts made outside the U.S. 57 This in turn would
increase foreign shipowners' overhead costs, thereby equalizing expend-
itures between foreign and American ships. 58 In holding that the inter-
nal economy rule prohibited the United States from protecting such
intrusive activities, the Court distinguished this case from Ariadne. 1 9
Through these cases the Supreme Court has declared that the in-
ternal economy rule prohibits the extension of U.S. labor laws to con-
duct aboard foreign ships unless U.S. workers are directly concerned.
Contrary to these decisions, the Clay Bill's extension of jurisdiction
only requires "regular trading" with the United States. Therefore, the
expressed such an intent, cautioned that to "run interference in such a delicate field of
international relations there must be present the affirmative intention of the Congress
clearly expressed." Id. at 147.
150. 397 U.S. 195 (1970).
151. Id. at 196.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 199.
154. Id. (reasoning that U.S. labor law should apply because "this dispute cen-
tered on wages to be paid [to] American residents").
155. 415 U.S. 104 (1974).
156. Id. at 112.
157. Id. at 114.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 115.
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Clay Bill's extension of jurisdictional reach of the NLRA exceeds that
which the judiciary has indicated. 160
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States, as a member of the seafaring community of
nations, has accepted the internal economy rule as a binding obligation
under international law. By the commands of this doctrine, Congress
must take special care in the exercise of its sovereign power to pre-
scribe laws that regulate the internal conduct of visiting ships from
other nations. Recognizing this obligation, the United States judiciary
has denied Congress' attempted intrusion into foreign vessels' internal
economy for the sole purposes of either increasing U.S. competitiveness
or extending the benefits of American goodwill to the world's seamen.
Instead, the United States has committed itself to apply its domestic
laws only where the absence of U.S. regulation would place a direct
hardship on its resources or its nationals.
The Clay Bill is precisely the sort of intrusive regulation the inter-
nal economy rule seeks to avoid. The Bill's purposes, protecting U.S.
shipping and extending benefits to seamen with tenuous connections to
the United States, run contrary to these time-honored principles of in-
ternational maritime law. Because, as of this writing, the Clay Bill has
not yet passed into law, a conflict with international law "may be [an]
appropriate ground for Congress to reject a proposed statute or for the
President to veto it."'161
Jason M. Schupp
160. However, courts have also addressed this issue. For example, in the recent
case of NLRB v. Dredge Operators, 19 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 1994), the Fifth Circuit
considered the National Labor Relations Board's efforts to apply the NLRA to a U.S.
flagged vessel that operated wholly within the territorial waters of Hong Kong. Dredge
Operators, 19 F.3d at 208. Because the dredge was engaged in a long-term project in
that country, the Hong Kong government insisted that the vessel comply with certain
local labor laws. The vessel's U.S. based operator resisted the NLRB on the grounds of
comity and extraterritoriality. Reviewing the decisions of the Supreme Court, the court
declared that international comity does not prevent the application of U.S. labor laws
to vessels flying the flag of the United States. Further, the court dismissed the ship
operator's claim that this constituted an impermissible extraterritorial application of
U.S. laws by invoking the ancient maxim that a ship is a piece of the territory of the
country whose flag it flies. Id. at 211. Therefore, the U.S. will apply its laws to the
internal affairs of its vessels - even if those laws conflict with the laws of another port
state. Comity dictates that the U.S. should defer to the inconsistent laws of other na-
tions when vessels from those nations visit a U.S. port.
161. RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, § 115 cmt. a.
